This article proposes an explanation of the structures of external financing by analysing the consequences of a leasing decision for unsecured creditors. A leasing decision generates two effects: the appearance of an agency cost related to the retrogradation of the existing banking claims and a reduction in the agency cost of debt related to the asset substitution problem. In opposition to a lessor, the banking creditor bears the agency cost that it passes on to the firm and its shareholders by an increase in the debtor rate or stronger collateral. The presence of excessive agency costs can however lead the creditor to ration the firm, and consequently constrains firms in their choice of external financing. Therefore, we can expect to observe quite marked ex ternal financing policies. The empirical study carried out on a sample of 817 Belgian companies shows two results: the companies seem to privilege rather typified financing policies: weak or significant recourse to leasing. Few companies in the sample have balanced structures. In the same way, the amplitude of the agency costs of leasing is reflected in the interest rate and the amount of collateral required.
Introduction
Leasing is a technique of investment financing, which experienced a strong development after the Second World War. This activity was transformed into a true specialized financial service, with the creation in 1952 of the first independent leasing company in the Un ited States. The practice then gained Europe and Japan in the Sixties. Nowadays, in the States of the OECD, up to a third of private investments are financed by leasing. This means of financing progressively attracts customers borrowing traditionally from banks. Leasing presents various characteristics compared to the traditional bank debt, which can justify its use by firms with extremely different profiles (complete financing, flexible financing, facility and speed of mobilization...). Identification of elements inciting financing by leasing remains, however, insufficient to allow comprehension of the choice of external financing (leasing versus banking loan decision). Leasing is often viewed as the last resort solution, for companies that undergo high costs of external financing or firms that are rationed (Sharpe and Nguyen (1995) ). In the same way, the lessor seems better protected than the banking creditor, justifying thus a stronger incentive to finance risky companies (Krishnan and Moyer (1994) ). This means of financing is however used by companies with less atypical profiles and is widespread.
This research proposes an explanation of the structures of external financing by analysing the consequences of a decision of financing by leasing, for the existing creditors. From this point of view, a leasing decision generates at least three effects: the appearance of agency costs related to the retrogradation of existing and unprotected banking debts, the reduction in the agency cost of debt related to the asset substitution problem and a negative externality resulting in a loss of financial mobility. On the contrary, financing by leasing gives the firm various advantages (integral financing which allows not to encumber capital stocks, flexibility, speed of installation...). By simultaneously considering the total agency costs and the profits associated with the leasing decision, it is possible to highlight optimal external financing policies and this in various contexts (no loss of financial mobility, no advantages tied to leasing financing and weak asset specificity). The presence of excessive agency costs can however lead banking creditors to refuse the choices of financing made by debtors and to ration them; this could then force companies to adopt sub -optimal financial policies.
Likewise, financing policies could be modified by an increase in economic risk: the stiffening of credit rationing, explained by the rise of agency costs sensitive to economic risk, leads to external financing structures with more leasing (this phenomena is chiefly true for firms financed less by leasing).
In fact, the model developed in this article allows the problem of credit rationing to be considered in the leasing versus banking loan decision. This is possible by taking into account an endogenous relation between credit charges and cost of leasing. The analysis finally gives the possibility of identifying other determinants of the implicit cost of leasing and credit and conduct to obtain a model that leads to empirical tests. The article is organized in the following way. In the first section, we present a review of the existing literature on the agency costs of secured debt, on which we base arguments to justify the presence of agency costs of leasing. The second section relates to the presentation of the determinants of the agency costs of leasing. The third section covers the leasing versus banking loan d ecision and endogeneises the possibility of credit rationing. Various external financing policies are highlighted, while varying certain parameters (gains related to financing by leasing, absence of cost related to loss of financial mobility and increase i n economic risk). The conclusions obtained hence can be subject to empirical tests, which are presented in a fourth section. In the last section, we conclude and present possible fields of research after pointing out the principal contributions of this paper.
Literature Background: Choice between Leasing and Banking Debt
Research in Finance is not very interested in the impact of leasing agency costs on corporate financing structure. Although the relation between a lessor and a lessee can lead to an agency conflict and consequently to agency costs 1 , our aim in this paper was to consider the consequences of a leasing decision for the existing creditors. Based on existing work concerning secured debt and the assumption of similar properties of the two types of financing (Smith and Wakeman (1985) and Krishnan and Moyer (1994) ), it is possible to highlight the bases of agency costs of leasing and to analyse their impact on the financing policies of firms.
Precursory works on secured debt (Scott (1977) and Smith and Warner (1979b) ) have dealt with the relation between the value of firm and the recourse to secured debt. According to Scott (1977) , the emission of secured debt can allow an increase in corporate value. Indeed, when a company issues a secured debt, shareholders commit themselves not only to refunding the capital borrowed at a later date but also to selling the creditors a priority claim in the event of default. This right has a certain value which shareholders cannot benefit from because they are the residual creditors in the event of failure.
1 Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that agency costs can occur in any situation implying a form of cooperation between two or several people, even if it does not have a well-defined relat ion principal-agent. In the relation lessor -lessee, the principal agency cost identified (Smith and Wakeman (1985) ) is related to the risk of abuse, of intensive use of the asset by the lessee, who does not have obligation to acquire the asset at the end of the contract. So, this cost is entirely borne by the lessor, reflected in a fall of the salvage value of the asset.
Thus, the firms must prefer to issue claims which have characteristics similar to the secured debt and which give a priority right to their holder. This will be especially true as the probability of corporate failure is high. Scott (1977) recommends thus a maximum use of financing by secured debt. According to Smith and Warner (1979b) , the analysis is limited if we consider only the ben efits of the secured debt: there is a limit to the financing by secured debt and so the firm must carry out arbitration between the costs and the benefits related to the means of financing.
In particular, it appears that the value of firm remains unchanged in the case of secured debt emission: the transfer of wealth due to the loss of priority in unsecured debts will be anticipated by the unprotected creditors (suppliers, banking creditors) and will be passed on to the company and its shareholders (increase in cost of debt, rationing and hardening of the commercial conditions).
The only advantage recognised with secured debt is the limitation of asset substitution risk highlighted by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . The choices of external financing (secured debt versus ordinary debt) are then explained by arbitrage between the benefits and the costs of financing.
Indeed, Stulz and Johnson (1985) underline the presence of costs related to the use of secured debt for the creditors and the lenders 2 and show that whatever the origin of these costs, they are completely borne by the firm and its shareholders.
However secured debt has beneficial properties. In particular, the collateral allows a decrease in the risk of dilution of creditor claims in event of default, since the contract allows to share ex-ante claims on the assets 3 : the protected creditor not only has a claim on the asset that constitutes the collateral, but also a claim on the other assets of the firm, when the value of the collateral is insufficient to cover payment of the remaining capital. Thus, the cost of secured debt is weaker than the cost of unsecured debt
In the same way, financing by protected debt allows a reduction in agency costs of debt 5 (Stulz and Johnson (1985) ). In fact, including a collateral prevents the firm from selling the asset to pay dividends or to reinvest the earnings of collateral sale in riskier projects. Secured debt constitutes hence a means of limiting asset substitution that is less expensive for the creditors than covenants in debt contracts (Smith and Warner (1979a) ). The agreement in the interests between lender and borrower benefits both the secured and unsecured creditors (Leeth and Scott (1989) ). Consequently, the choice of the firm is taken after comparison between costs and benefits of an issue of secured debt. In the same way, several elements can influence the propensity of firms to resort to financing giving their stockholder priority claims. There is first the probability of corporate failure. Stulz and Johnson (1985) show that the value of the guaranteed debt increases for stockholders when the probability of default increases and consequently involves a reduction in the value of the unsecured debt. Thus, one could expect that firms having high debt ratios to use secured debt more often. Moreover in particular cases associated with a strong probability that credit engagements would not be covered (significant economic risk for the firm and bad economic conditions), the firm must be financed in a more significant way by secured debt. Size can also influence the choice of financing (Smith and Warner (1979b) ): since a small firm has a greater probability of liquidation than a large company, then it must resort in a dominating way to the secured debt. Leeth and Scott (1989) also highlight a positive relation between the size of loan and the probability that the loan is secured. The same relation is observed for the loan maturity. Smith and Wakeman (1985) extend the analysis of Stulz and Johnson (1985) and Scott (1977) to leasing and underline the presence of properties similar to the two means of financing. Indeed, as for secured debt, leasing offers a protection for the creditor: the legal ownership of the asset remains with the lessor until the lifting of the option, which confers security to him and authorises it to repossess the asset in the event of failure. Thus, it appears that the leasing decision is prejudicial to the unsecured creditors and involves a depreciation of their claims.
Furthermore, financing by leasing allows a reduction in the asset substitution risk: the legal ownership of the asset belongs to the lessor and prevents operations to invest and reinvest in risky projects. The firm in addition is forced to exploit the activity for an irrevocable period. Although the two types of financing have similar properties, they nevertheless show different characteristics. For Krishnan and Moyer (1994) , financing by leasing involves bankruptcy costs for the lessor lower than secured debt for the protected creditor: in the event of corporate default, the lessor can reclaim possession of the asset more easily and more quickly and with minima legal costs.
For the secured creditor, the procedure is longer. Thus, the lessor avoids the slow process of failure resolution and can more quickly resell the asset on a second market. Since leasing involves lower bankruptcy costs for the lessor than for the secured creditor, it seems to be the only means of financing for firms presenting a significant risk of default. Thus, the policies of external financing available to the firms can be explained by the position of the creditors in the event of failure: increase in economic risk seems to give recourse to financing which allows priority claims by the creditors. However, if the value of the secured debt or leasing is conversely connected to the value of the unsecured debt, the unprotected creditors will try ex -ante to secure against any future depreciation of their claims by limiting the possibilities of financing. Since the leasing decision generates agency gains (the reduction in asset substitution risk), the unsecured creditors can tolerate leasing in the financial debt.
In fact, the financing policies available for the firms cannot be explained without confron ting the total agency costs, the amount of the agency costs that could be passed on to the firm and its shareholders and finally the costs and benefits related to the financing by leasing: indeed, leasing forces the firm to bear a loss of financial mobilit y but the financing can bring various advantages (flexible financing, integral financing...). The remaining of the article directs towards the problem of the choice between financing by banking debt versus leasing and the financing policies developed by the firms.
Leasing versus Banking Debt and Agency Costs
In this section, we voluntarily make an inventory of the agency costs related to a leasing decision by restricting ourselves to the leasing versus banking debt choice. We reason in the following with a financial leverage constant.
Three types of costs of agency can thus be highlighted 6 . The first results from the inherent safety for the lessor in the case of a leasing contract, which hence downgrades the other debts. The second arises from the legal ownership of the asset, to which is not subject the lessee and prohibits any manipulation in risk of investment projects. The third can be interpreted as a negative externality related to legal ownership to which is not subject the lessee and it prohibits if is necessary a m obility which is sometimes economically desirable and necessary.
Costs linked to the retrogradation of unsecured debt
An unanticipated leasing decision leads to a retrogradation in rank of the unsecured debts in the event of liquidation; this assertion takes on great importance if one considers moreover than the alternative financing is financing by additional debt of the same rank. Indeed, the unsecured creditors do not have any claim on the asset financed, contrary to what would occur if the asset were financed by a banking debt of the same rank. In the facts, this leasing decision leads to a reduction in the value of these unsecured debts that expresses the extent of the agency cost borne by the unsecured creditors (Jones and Mason (1980) ; Lobez (1985) ). If the unsecured creditors anticipate the decision, the agency cost still exists, but it takes another form. It will result either in an increase in the cost of debt during the contract negotiation by inclusion of a risk premium in the debtor rate, or by an increase in credit rationing risk, or even by insertion of expensive restrictive clauses in the bond contracts (or banking contracts) (John and Kalay (1983); Lobez (1987); Smith and Warner (1979)); let us notice that these costs are systematically borne by the shareholders of the firm. However these costs exist only if there is perception of a real risk of bankruptcy by the unsecured creditors. They are all the higher when the risk of bankruptcy is felt to be high. If one wonders about the extent of these costs and their sensitivity to the leasing versus banking loan decision, we can note that two effects are to be considered simultaneously. The first effect, or price effect, is included in the growth of the marginal agency cost when the proportion of financing by leasing increases. The more the percentage of leasing financing increases, the more expensive is the effect related to retrogradation of the debts. However, beyond this price effect, one must obviously consider the financial base to which this marginal cost growth applies. In particular, when the firm is financed entirely by leasing and there is no other debt, retrogradation of the unsecured debts does not exist and although the marginal cost is very high, the total cost is nil.
We thus conclude that the curve of total agency cost noted C 1 is concave and that this agency cost is nil i n extreme situations, i.e. when the firm is financed entirely by ordinary debt or leasing (graph 1). This cost finally increases with economic risk, with financial risk as measured by financial leverage and dependent on the leasing versus banking debt decision, and the proportion of financing by leasing.
Reduction of the agency costs of debt
Asset substitution can be decided by the shareholders to contribute to an objective of maximisation of the corporate value when this is financed by debt. The application of the options theory to the corporate analysis shows that shareholders can be incited to enter strategies of asset substitution which, all else equal, would lead to an increase in the economic risk of the firm (Black and Scholes (1973) ; Galai and Masulis (1976) ). This result however is verified only if shareholders perceive a default risk, which is not nil 7 ; in this situation, the limited liability of the shareholder legitimates this result. By focusing on the asset substitution problem, leasing and banking debt are means of financing that have quite different properties. Leasing, by dissociating use and ownership of the asset, prevents indeed any manipulation of economic risk and this is at the detriment of creditors. Limiting ourselves to the leasing versus banking loan decision (without collateral), one can say indeed that banking debt produces agency costs or, that on the contrary, leasing is characterised by " agency gains", because financing of the asset with this means prohibits any investment and reinvestment operation. With the supposition of a firm financed by banking debt in addition to its own capital stocks, the asset substitution risk is all the higher since the default risk is high. The agency costs are thus borne directly by the creditors who see the value of their claims lowering ex post; they can be also passed on to the shareholders if the creditors anticipated this risk. It leads hence to an increase in the cost of debt, an increase in credit rationing or a shortening of the debt maturity (it forces renegotiations of contracts more frequently).
Conversely, the higher the percentage of leasing in the financial debt, the less this risk is present and the lower the agency costs related to the asset substitution are 8 (noted C 2 ). Graph 1 shows this result.
Graph 1. Evolution of agency costs and credit rationing
7 If such is not the case, the aversion for risk by shareholders would lead them on the contrary to prefer less risky projects, all things being equal. 8 On the contrary to the previous case, the marginal cost and the total cost C 2 are decreasing with the proportion of financing by leasing. 
A negative externality: the lack of mobility and the loss of operating flexibility
The previous section underlined the virtues of leasing which limits risk manipulation. But, these modifications in the economic destination of assets can be desirable, even necessary. It will be the case when a firm is invested in a sector which is no longer buoyant or which is subjected to a major structural shock. In this case, investment withdrawal from this sector can be necessary and leasing then limits industrial redeployment: this is so, more especially when the asset specificity is high. This constitutes cost linked to this means of financing and borne especially by shareholders 9 .
This cost (noted C 3 ) will be all the higher when the probability of having to operate redeployment is strong, which corresponds in particular to the case of sectors become ripe, or to small-sized firms that are present in a sector in reorganization (where the tendency to concentration is present) etc. This cost will also increase with specificity of the asset financed, with the default risk, and the proportion of leasing in the financial debt (graph 1).
A last cost can be considered. Indeed, leasing relates generally to the financing of tangible assets. The investments relating to intangib le assets can be reduced or eliminated when the firm is financed mainly by leasing and the internal funds are insufficient. Thus, the more the proportion of leasing increases in the financial debt and the more risk of underinvestment there is. This risk is at its maximum when leasing wholly finances the firm.
The curve of cost C 3 is modified when the cost linked to rigidity in the investment choices is taken into account: indeed, in the areas where the financial debt is mainly constituted of leasing commitments, cost C 3 is higher.
Thus, the curve is increasing and convex. The shareholders who lose the actual net value of the projects not carried out directly bear this cost. The inclusion or exclusion of this cost does not modify results: thereafter, we will not include this cost in the analysis.
Leasing versus Banking Debt Decision
In this section, we first present the case of resolution of the leasing versus banking debt decision, by underlining the role of credit rationing. We determine then the nature of the optimal policies in particular cases (extreme structures of costs), then the general case and finally the link between economic risk for the firm and leasing versus banking debt choice.
Resolution of the leasing versus banking debt decision
The resolution of this question leads to a systematic comparison of the costs and advantages of the two means of financing and the inclusion of the decisions of capital suppliers. The sum of the agency costs must indeed be arbitrated against the advantages specific to the means of financing concerned.
From this point of view and while remaining in the comparative mode, one could quote advantages traditionally recognized in leasing: the flexibility of the contract, speed of setting up, the fact that it constitutes complete financing 10 , the flexibility of the rentals likely to be adapted to estimates of treasury, etc. These advantages increase with the proportion of the financial debt given over to leasing. We note G, the financial value of all these advantages opposite to the costs C = C 1 +C 2 +C 3 .
The comparison of profits and costs is insufficient however to account for the optimal decisions. We need indeed, to supplement the analysis and to consider the capital supply. From this point of view, lessors and banking creditors do not have the same advantages. Indeed a lessor does not bear any agency costs shown in the previous section, whereas the supplier of banking debt bears costs C 1 and C 2 11 completely. These costs cannot, in addition, be completely passed on to the firm and its shareholders 12 insofar as increase in interest rates could have perverse effects, inducing in particular firms to compensate for this extra cost by a purchase of excessive risk (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) ), going against the interest of the unsecured creditor.
Thus we deduce, that beyond a certain threshold, the agency costs become dissuasive and lead to credit rationing for the firm. This gives K as the threshold. The combinations of debt and leasing acceptable for banker must thus check the following condition: C 1 +C 2 < K.
The curve of total cost being concave 13 , increasing then decreasing, it is thus possible that the firm cannot choose balanced financial combinati ons and on the contrary, it is forced to choose a very marked financial structure, made up mainly of debt or leasing. Among all of the possible combinations, the firm then chooses the traditional combination of debt and leasing to maximize the net profit (or minimize the net loss) between the value of the advantages and the costs of leasing. Graph 2 shows how the choices of financial policies are made. The higher quadrant of this graph allows us to determine the possible structure compatible with the financial equilibrium of the bank. In the lower quadrant, the optimal policy is determined by comparison of functions C and G. 
Particular cases
The optimal financial policies being particularly marked as we have just seen, the identification of these policies will depend crucially on the relationship between the maximum profits related to leasing (noted G m ) and the maximum costs related to the externality (noted C 3m ). We thus consider two cases according to respective situations of C 3m and G m .
G m much higher than C 3m
Let us imagine a firm present in a protected sector and for which one can consider that the probability of having to redeploy is nil. The cost of the externality is thus nil. Graph 3 shows that the optimal finan cial policy consists in resorting to a complete financing by leasing to benefit fully from its advantages. 
3.2.2.G m much lower than C 3m
To simplify, let us imagine the case where the profits specific to leasing have a nil value. In this case, the optimal policy corresponds to an objective of minimization of the agency costs. The curve of the total costs C increasing then decreasing, it follows that the optimal policy is determined by comparison between C 3m and C 2m (the maximum of the agency costs C 2 when the firm does not use leasing). We have:
-If C 3m >C 2m , complete financing by debt (Graph 4) -If C 3m <C 2m , complete financing by leasin g In the general case and taking into account the general shape of the curves of costs and profits, and the possibility of cred it rationing, the selected structures of external financing will generally be marked and deduced then by the relative importance of C 2m on the one hand and on the other hand by C 3m -G m . Minimal loss
C 3m
Agency costs C 1 C 2 and C 3
Area of credit rationing
Proportion of leasing commitments in the debt load
More balanced policies can be wished for by the firms; in this case, the financial constraint imposed by banks can lead these companies to have to choose a " second best " policy (graph 5). 
Optimal policies and economic risk
In this paragraph, we deal with the influence of the economic risk 14 for the firm on the structure of its external financing. This influence is expressed by the constraint of rationing imposed by the banks, which becomes more rigorous. Indeed, as we specified in the first section, costs C 1 and C 2 increase with the economic risk: this means, for a fixed tolerance level K, that credit rationing by banking creditors hardens.
Considering an extreme case, we observe first that for the very good firms (no risk), the choice of a financial policy depends again on the comparison between C 3m and G, since the costs C 1 and C 2 are thus nil. We have:
-If C 3m >G m : choice of complete financing by debt -If C 3m <G m : choice of complete financing by leasing More generally, the increase in economic risk widens the ranges of rationing and can, in the same sector, lead to a radical modification in : graph 6 attests this case since the optimal policy passes from a structure associating leasing and debt to complete financing by leasing. This result can be generalized in proposal 1.
Proposal 1:
The increase in economic risk leads to the increase in areas of rationing but in an asymmetrical way, i.e. by rationing the firms more in their choice of policy with little leasing. Hence these companies will be forced to choose policies with more leasing.
Demonstration:
The first two parts of the proposal are commonplace and their demonstration stems directly from the consideration of the form of curve C 1 +C 2 and the influence of risk on these costs. To demonstrate the last part of the proposal, let us notice first that for a firm resorting to complete financing by leasing, the total cost function C = C 1 +C 2 +C 3 is insensitive to economic risk and is equal to C 3m . Conversely, for a firm resorting to complete financing by debt, the increase in the economic risk causes a growth in C 2m and thus a decrease in the relative advantage of the debt if this exists. The asymmetry in the effects on advantages and relative disadvantages of the two means of financing is thus at the origin of this conclusion. 
Area of credit rationing

Finally, these conclusions can be synthesized on graph 7 which represents the acceptable and optimal policies of firms' external financing and their evolution according to the economic risk. On this graph, a cone was traced which represents the area of the prohibited financial structures due to rationing by the banks. This graph illustrates the case of firms in a sector for which the profits related to leasing are relatively low in comparison with the particular cost of the externality related to the loss of flexibility that this financing 15 generates. We observe that financing by leasing must be increasing and that the policies must be all the more marked (because of a stronger constraint of rationing) when the risk is high. Graph 7. Acceptable financial structure, optimal policies and economic risk
Empirical Study on a Sample of Belgium companies
The models developed in the previous section, led to various assumptions on external financing policies. In particular, we showed that credit rationing, a consequence of the existence of excessive agency costs, could constitute an explanatory factor of marked external financing policies (weak recourse to leasing or dominantly leasing-based financing). 15 The other case is less interesting (and undoubtedly less probable) and led to optimal policies constituted by complete financing by leasing. In the first part of the empirical study, we will examine the distribution of corporate financing structures. Since credit rationing restricts companies financing choices, one can expect to observe quite typical policies and consequently a distribution of the external financing structures having U shape. As an increase in the economic risk reinforces the intensity of credit rationing, differences in external financing policies should be observed according to the economic risk presented by the firms.
Then we propose three econometric tests relating to agency costs C 1 and C 2 : indeed, although we do not know the precise general shape of total curve C 1 +C 2 , the analysis made in the previous section showed that costs C 1 +C 2 initially increased 16 then decreased (the growth or the decrease in these costs directly depends on the proportion of leasing in the financial debt). The unsecured creditor can pass a part of these costs on to the firm and its shareholders by acting on the interest rate. He also has another action variable: the collateral required. By observing how the determinants of the debt contract behaved, for two groups of companies, one group being financed little by leasing and another resorting to a significant amount of leasing, it is possible to appreciate the amplitude of the agency costs at the two ends of the curve of total agency costs. Since we make the assumption that agency costs of leasing are instantaneously passed on to the firm and its shareholders by acting on interest rate or on collateral, the dependent and the independent variables in the econometric models are computed in 1994.
Data and methodology
4.1.1.Data and sample selection
The data analyzed in the study come from the central authority for balance sheet assessments of the National Bank of Belgium, which diffuses the annual statements of Belgian companies 17 . As regards leasing operations, Belgium gave priority to economic detention compared to legal ownership 18 . 16 The increase in agency costs C 1 + C 2 exists only if the increase of agency cost C 1 is greater than the decrease of agency cost C 2 .
Leasing is activated in the assessment of the companies, which consequently makes it possible to obtain very precise data on this operation in the databases. According to Belgian accounting law, the lessee must mention in the assets the capital value of the good financed by leasing. In the liabilities, one finds the leasing commitm ent, i.e. the fraction of the payments related to the later tax-years, representing the reconstitution in capital of the value of the good 19 . Leasing commitment decrease each year with capital repayments.
The various accounting data necessary to our study concerning leasing are available in the database of the central authority for balance sheet assessmen ts of the Bank of Belgium 20 . To constitute our sample, we used the various following criteria: -The firm must be financed in 1994 by leasing 21 .
-The data concerning the companies must be available over the period 1989-1994. -The company must present positive capital stocks for the various years considered.
-The companies for which the passage of the various equations of coherence revealed a significant error rate were eliminated from the sample. -Companies belonging to sectors 8 (Banks, insurance companies, corporate services providers and renting companies) and 9 (Other services: general administration, national defense, social security, teaching...) were excluded.
We also eliminated firms whose principal means of external financing is bond debt. We centered our research only on the leasing versus bank loan decision. In the same way, we concentrated on the financing of movables. The companies, whose leasing commitments related to mainly real estate , were eliminated.
The final sample contains 817 companies whose distribution by sector is given in the following The histogram of sizes 22 is represented in figure 8 . After application of a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney's test, we show the absence from significant difference of size between the firms, which resort to leasing and privilege only banking debt as a means of external financing. Sharpe & Nguyen (1995) and Levis & Lasfer (1997) observe however that the companies, financed by leasing, are in general smaller than the other firms 23 . These authors use a measurement different to gauge size: the number of employees. It can explain the differences in the relation observed.
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Methodology and econometric tests
The first part of the empirical study relates to the distribution of financing structures. The cone presented in section 4 suggests a statistical distribution of the external financing structures having a U shape: indeed, below a level of risk, all financing policies are possible. Increase in economic risk leads to an intensification of credit rationing, and so to more marked policies and a more significant recourse to leasing. Thus, one can expect to observe companies financed with little or considerable leasing, and few companies choosing intermediate financing policies. Thus the construction of various classes of risk allows us to test the impact of an increase in economic risk on the proportion of leasing financing.
We propose therefore three econometric tests intended to check the presence and the amplitude of total agency costs C 1 +C 2 . These costs initially increase with the percentage of leasing financing in the financial debt, then decrease when leasing becomes the principal means of financing preferred by the firm.
These agen cy costs, incurred by the unsecured creditors are passed on to the firm and its shareholders (areas of credit rationing correspond to situations where the creditor cannot entirely recover these agency costs, without exposing itself to perverse effects lied to an increase in the interest rate). They appear either in the amount of the interest rate or in the guarantees required by the unprotected creditor. One can also expect combined effect on the debtor rate and the guarantees (this justifies consequently a simultaneousequations model).
a. Variable measurement
The accounting data present in the annual statements allow us to compute the variables necessary to carry out the various tests. The decision variables of banks are also computed with accounting data. The interest charges (INTER) are measured by relating the amount of the financial expenses to the amount of the financial debts. The proportion of the guaranteed debts (COL) is defined as the ratio of debts guaranteed to the amount of financial debts (except leasing commitments).
In models, the explanatory variable of interest rate and guarantees required is the proportion of leasing financing in the financial debt (PLF). The economic risk (RISK) also constitutes an explanatory variable with the models. It positively influences the interest charges and the level of the guarantees required. Economic risk is often associated with the volatility of the profitability rate.
Thus, a firm presents a illiquidity risk all the higher when its debt increases and the volatility of the rate of economic profitability is significant. We determined a coefficient of variation in firm's earnings. To measure this variable, we use the standard deviation of EBDIT (earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes) divided by the mean level of book value of total assets, for the 1989 -1994 24 period. This measurement is used by Graham, Lemmon and Schalleim (1998) and MacKie-Mason (1990) and constitutes an indicator of probability of bankrup tcy 25 .
Among the control variables selected, which allow integrating elements likely to influence the parameters of debt contract (debtor rate and guarantees), one finds:
-Company short-term liquidity (LIQ). We gauge liquidity by current assets (i.e. of less than one year) divided by current assets (i.e. of less than one year). A significant value of this ratio is associated to a weak risk of illiquidity. The variable LIQ must be negatively connected to the debtor rate and the guarantees required.
-Company size (SIZE). It is measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets. The large companies present a default risk which is lower than the companies of a smaller size: their activities are often diversified and depend less on success of a particular project, contrary to small-sized companies (Diamond (1984) ). Size may be negatively related to interest charges and collateral.
-Debt maturity (MAT). It is defined as the ratio of current liabilities to long-term debt. The variable MAT is positively associated with the interest rate and certainly does not intervene in the determination of the amount of collateral.
-Leverage (LEV). It is measured as the ratio of long-term commitments to the amount of capital stock. All else equal, a high debt ratio is associated with a greater risk of default. We expect thus a positive relation with interest charges and collateral.
-Legal form of firm (LFS). It constitutes a control variable, which can influence the decision of the creditor. We use a dummy variable, which is equal to one if the company is a public limited company and zero if not. The asset substitution risk will be all the weaker since the manager holds a significant share of the firm. It is generally the case in partnerships. The legal form can influence the cost of credit; the impact on collateral is less obvious.
-Amount of intangible assets (INT).
To measure this coefficient, we use the value of intangible assets divided by total fixed assets. Myers (1977) and Titman and Wessels (1988) show that a banker is reticent to finance firms having more growth options in their investment opportunity sets because the profitability of the project is not immediate and the assets that can constitute guarantees are weaker. The variable INC will be positively correlated with the interest rate and the guarantees required.
For some firms, the values of certain variables were extreme (much higher than the average value observed for the whole sample). The variables were limited so that the atypical cases do not influence the results obtained. The following The distributions of various variables are strongly asymmetrical, platykurtic or leptokurtic 26 . The normality of variables is thus to be exclu ded. It is the same for statistical tests depending on the assumption of normality.
b. Models tested
To verify the presence and the amplitude of agency costs, we formulate three models that we test on two groups of firms: group 1 is composed of a quarter of the sample companies, so 204 firms financed least by leasing (the proportion of leasing commitments in the financial debt is lower than 4%). Group 2 contains firms whose percentage of leasing in the financial debt is between 80 and 100%, consequently 153 companies 27 . Relations observed for group 1 should inform us about the shape of curve C 1 +C 2 : a growth in agency costs is anticipated when the financing by leasing is low, unless the growth of C 1 costs is more important than the decrease of C 2 costs. On the contrary, a decrease in agency costs is anticipated when leasing is the principal means of external financing used by the company. Tests carried out on group 2 will confirm or cancel our assumption.
The two groups of companies have some different characteristics: firms in group 2 are more leveraged than firms in group 1, more liquid and resort more to short term debt, but present a higher economic risk.
In appendix 1 we provide the descriptive statistics on the two groups of companies and the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test.
We test the three following models: The control variables retained in equation (1) One can expect, in one or more equations, the ? coefficient to be positive for the companies belonging to group 1 and negative for the companies in group 2. In the two equations, coefficient ? must be positive for the two groups of firms. In the simultaneousequations model, the estimate procedure is the following one. It acts initially, to verify for each equation of the simultaneous-equations model, the presence of an identification problem due to a correlation between endogenous variables and errors terms in the different estimated equations.
Hence for each equation we apply a Hausman specification test. The results obtained will determine the method of estimation of each equation. In the event of simultaneity, the O.L.S estimator is not consistent and it is necessary to resort to other estimation procedures (Indirect Least Squares, Two-Stage Least Squares, Maximum Likelihood estimator). For group 2, the subsample of companies resorting to significant leasing, the Hausman test shows an absence of simultaneity. The procedure of estimation selected is consequently O.L.S. For group 1, the subsample of companies preferring banking debt as a means of external financing, the Hausman test shows a correlation between the "interest rate" and "guarantees required" variables. The two equations were estimated by two S.L.S. This choice is explained by difficulties to use maximum likelihood procedure because of the particular form of error distributions in equations.
Based on actual estimations, the tests of hypotheses were conducted with a nonparametric approach: a " bootstrap " technique. This choice is explained by the fact that the error distributions are not gaussian. However the presentation of the estimation process is not the purpose of this article. The technique used is proposed by Freeman and Peters (1984) for the 2SLS and by Wong (1996) for Hausman test. The p-values are obtained on 1000 "bootstrap" samples.
Empirical results
External financing distribution
The statistical distribution of external financing structures is represented on figure  9 . In accordance with the theoretic models, one can observe a distribution having a U shape: the sample companies seem to privilege quite typified structures of external financing: 34% of the firms present a ratio of leasing lower than 5%, 23.65% of the companies have a ratio higher than 50 % and 16% of the firms are financed entirely by leasing. This last group could be the subject of a more precise analysis in order to determine the explanatory factors of such a financing policy (advantages related to the leasing can constitute a possible explanation).
No sectional difference appears between the firms adopting radically different policies. In a second step, we try to determinate the link between the level of risk and the firms' financial structure: indeed, the increase in economic risk accentuates credit rationing, and consequently constraints the companies from adopting more marked policies, and even choosing more leasing. Consequently, we built up three classes of risk (economic risk: weak, average and high) according to the values taken by the RISK variable. For each class, we built up the distribution of the external financing structures.
The histograms do not show more significant recourse to leasing or banking debt when the economic risk increases. The Chi-2 test confirms this result. The structure of external financing seems independent of the level of economic risk. 
Tests on agency costs of leasing
The various tables presented below synthesize the results obtained for the three specified models, and for the two groups of companies. The results obtained highlight several elements: -For group 1, only the models with simple equations are satisfactory and provide significant results. Consequently, model 3 is not retained. We note that the increase in financing by leasing has a positive and significant impact on the debtor rate required by the banking creditors (coefficient equal to 1.612 significant at 1%) and on the guarantees required (coefficient equal to 7.083 significant at 5%).
The effect seems more marked for the collateral. This confirms the presence of agency costs of leasin g and their growth when a firm passes from a situation where it was financed completely by banking debt with a moderate recourse to this way of financing. Indeed, any leasing commitment involves a depreciation of the unsecured claims in favor of the lessor, who is the least affected creditor in case of bankruptcy. The legal form of the company (the fact that the company is a public limited company) influences the debtor rate negatively however. If the asset substitution problem is higher in the companies where the liability of shareholders is limited to their contribution, public limited companies nevertheless undergo lower debtor rates. This contrary result can be explained by the fact that these firms may seem, for the banking creditor, to present a lower risk than partnerships. As the asset substitution risk is accentuated with the degradation of financial state, the creditor thus seems initially sensitive to the economic risk presented by the firm. The debtor rate is positively correlated with the MAT variable. The amount of collateral required is negatively correlated with the size and positively correlated with the economic risk presented by the firm. The LEV variable becomes significant at 10% when the equation is estimated by the "bootstrap" technique and is correlated positively with the debtor rate required.
-On the contrary, for group 2, the amount of guarantees required by the unsecured creditors is negatively correlated with the extent of financing by leasing (coefficient equal to -1.380, critical probability: 0%), with liquidity and size. No effect can be noted for the interest rate. The reduction in the agency costs seems thus to be reflected in the amount of collateral. The effect cannot however be charged completely to the decrease in agency costs of leasing insofar as the assets are able potentially to constitute guarantees decrease when the amount of the fixed assets financed by leasing grows. For the companies in group 2, the interest rate is particularly sensitive to the amount of intangible assets. Indeed, the mass of the assets that can constitute a collateral, is lower compared to that of the companies in group 1, which explains the reaction of the banking creditor who raises the interest rate, because of impossibility to act on collateral. In addition, the results obtained in models one and two are confirmed in the simultaneous-equations model.
Conclusion
In this article we have tried to identify agency costs of leasing. In particular, the leasing decision has two major consequences for the existing creditors: appearance of an agency cost related to retrogradation of existing banking debts and a reduction in agency cost of debt related to the asset substitution risk. Leasing however generates various advantages for the firm, although it may also reduce its operational flexibility. Through the lessor does not bear any of these costs, the banking creditor bears these agency costs completely, which it can pass on to the firm and its shareholders by an increase in the debtor rate, stronger guarantees or credit rationing. The companies may be deprived of some external financing policies when the unprotected creditor cannot entirely defer these agency costs. Thus, firms are led to sub-optimal choices. An increase in the economic risk can cause a transfer of financing by banking debt to financing by leasing (the phenomenon is observed more for the companies having little recourse to leasing).
Through a sample of 817 companies, we tried to empirically check the assumptions advanced concerning the choices of financing policies and the extent of the agency costs of leasing. Two results are produced: first, companies seem to privilege quite marked financing policies: weak or considerable use of financing by leasing. Few companies present in the sample choose intermediate financing structures. This can be explained by the attitude of the banking creditor who rations the firm when the agency costs incurred are too high. This confirms the conclusions drawn from the theoretical models. In the same way, the amplitude of the agency costs of leasing is reflected in the interest rate and the guarantees required. This is verified only for the firms resorting to leasing in a marginal way. For the co mpanies which are more substantially financed by leasing, the creditor privileges only collateral as an action variable. Consequently, the banker reacts to the presence of a leasing commitment by an increase in the debtor rate and guarantees. On the contrary, the decrease in agency costs produces a reduction in the guarantees required. Through one cannot with certainty charge the results to the amplitude of the agency costs of leasing, the analysis shows, however, that no leasing commitment is neutral for the unsecured creditors. The distribution of the financial structure testifies to this effect. The results were obtained from accounting data. Work on contractual data would certainly provide better results and allow the results obtained to be confirmed. In the same way, it seems important to include in the empirical study the cost related to loss in operating flexibility. A study per industry sector would permit this dimension to be integrated in the analysis. 
